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ABSTRACT
30 years ago PABX systems were compromised by hackers wanting to make long
distance calls at some other entities expense. This activity faded as telephony
became cheaper and PABX systems had countermeasures installed to overcome
attacks. Now the world has moved onto the provision of telephony via broadband
enabled Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) with this service now being provided
as a replacement for conventional fixed wire telephony by major
telecommunication providers worldwide. Due to increasing bandwidth it is
possible for systems to support multiple voice connections simultaneously. The
networked nature of the Internet allows for attackers of these VoIP systems to
enumerate and potentially attack and compromise a wide range of vulnerable
systems. This paper is an outline of preliminary research into malfeasant VoIP
activity on the Internet.
Keywords: VoIP, honeypot
INTRODUCTION
Voice over IP systems are replacing conventional switched wire telephone
devices, these systems rely on Internet connectivity for the transmission of voice
conversations. Many large corporations have been successfully using these types
of systems over a number of years to lower communications costs relating to
telephony. We are now seeing this technology being placed into homes through
such initiatives as the UK-based BT Home, Australian based iinet BOB and
various American offerings. These systems work by replacing conventional fixed
line telephony with broadband connected wireless enabled routers that provide
not only Internet access but VoIP services within the home or business.
Some 30 years ago computer hackers compromised PABX systems to facilitate
cheap long-distance calling through the rerouting of their modem calls through
these compromised systems. This illegal rerouting enabled the hackers for the cost
of a local call to stay connected to long-distance phone calls for any period of
time that they wished to. The actual costs for such long-distance calls was borne
by the owner of the PABX system not the hacker and diagnostics on these
systems often only indicated that the calls originated from the PABX. This mode
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of attack started to decrease as PABX developers hardened their devices against
attack by these interloping attackers by placing countermeasures in the PABX.
This coupled with long distance telephony becoming cheaper and eventually
broadband digital services such as ADSL and ISDN replacing acoustic modems
and the PSTN as the main carrier for Internet traffic.
Due to technological restraint it was relatively difficult to have more than a oneto-one connection between the attacker and responding devices. This paradigm
has now changed with the introduction of VoIP systems where an attacker can
control many telephony sessions from the one device.
VoIP is most typically sent as a clear text transmission and is relatively trivial task
to intercept with a simple packet sniffer. The transport for the supporting
protocols of VoIP are typically UDP based. In addition there are already a variety
of tools that can intercept and replay voice conversations that are conducted over
VoIP channels. Not all of the tools capable of interception or enumeration are in
the realm of hacker based tools some are legitimate packages such as Wireshark
or NMAP.
VoIP systems suffer from the same Achilles' heel that all core services do in that
for it to be useful it must be available for connection from unknown parties. In the
same way that a Web server serves web pages to requesting clients likewise a
VoIP server must allow unknown connections to start for a voice conversation to
occur. As a result much of the authentication and authorisation has to be open,
disallowing the provider of the service basic protections against malicious activity
from parties who are interested in enumerating or compromising a system.
THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE – FACTORS INTERSECTING
There are various tools available for the enumeration and subsequent compromise
of VoIP systems. The following table represents some of the more common tools
and indicates their abilities many of these tools have been freely available since
2005.
Name

Description/Modus Operandii

SIPVicious Tool Suite svmap lists the SIP devices found in an network. svwar maps
‐ svmap, svwar,
active extensions on a PBX. Svcrack is a password cracker
svcrack
for SIP
sipflanker

Many (if not most) VoIP devices have available a Web GUI
for their configuration, management, and report generation.
And unfortunately it is also common for the username and
password to have the default values.

sipcrack

Sipdump finds SIP logins, then sipcrack is used bruteforce
passwords on the identified logins
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Name

Description/Modus Operandii

steganrtp

SteganRTP is a steganography tool which establishes a full‐
duplex steganographic data transfer protocol utilizing Real‐
time Transfer Protocol (RTP) packet payloads as the cover
medium. The tool provides interactive chat, file transfer, and
remote shell.

sipp

Test tool and traffic generator

sipsak

sipsak is a small command line tool for developers and
administrators of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
applications. It can be used for some simple tests on SIP
applications and devices.

VoIPER

VoIPER is a security toolkit that aims to allow developers and
security researchers to easily, extensively and automatically
test VoIP devices for security vulnerabilties

UCSniff

UCSniff is an assessment tool that allows users to rapidly
test for the threat of unauthorized VoIP eavesdropping.
UCSniff supports SIP and Skinny signaling, G.711‐ulaw and
G.722 codecs, and a MITM ARP Poisoning mode.

In addition to this, there have been numerous articles in the literature that relate to
vulnerability in the VoIP protocol [1-3] some even describe how to use the above
tools to achieve enumeration or even exploit of a VoIP system. There also several
books on the exploitation of VoIP [4]. This level of information availability,
coupled with the increasing numbers of encoded ready to use hostile tools is a
malevolent landscape waiting to happen.
In the last three to five years many large infrastructure providers as previously
mentioned have started to offer integrated IP/Telephony/VoIP solutions for the
home user. This current status quo now provides the attackers with not only
knowledge that has moved from tacit (theoretical attack) to explicit (code tools for
exploit) but also an increased opportunity for exploit and compromise of hosts
through the deployment of VoIP systems in homes sees for the first time viability
of attacking these systems for gain.
MOTIVATIONS FOR ATTACKING VOIP
Most of the key drivers for motivation of attacking and compromising VoIP
systems is built around financial gain in a similar fashion to the PABX
compromises of past. The attacker's motivation is to use the victim system as a
conduit for malfeasant traffic and have the victim bear the charged cost of any
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such activity. The other motivations of course are still classic disruption or denial
of service to the victim.
FINANCIAL GAIN
There are numerous telephone calling cards one can use to call cheaply overseas
that utilize systems legitimately and use technology such as VoIP to lower costs
for providers of the service. The low cost is enabled through the use of VoIP
technologies. The use of a calling card normally involves calling a legitimate
number and then keying in the long distance number you wish to call. As a result
of keying in the number you are then normally redirected through a cheaper
service typically VoIP and calls are initiated to the requested number. The call
quality of these systems is sometimes degraded but then the costs are significantly
lower for users of these systems.
The illegitimate use of these systems would see compromised VoIP systems
being utilised to route the incoming calls to the destination at the expense of the
owner of the compromised system. The other method is to use rerouting to dial
premium subscriber-based phone lines that charge a set rate per minute for the
connection to the end user typically on a range of between $1 - $8 a minute again
typically depending on the type of service offered. The difference in price after
servicing fees from the provider of the premium number then becomes the profit
that is sent to the entity that set up the premium number service for providing the
service normally the compromiser of the system.
Malicious users could hide much of their activity by distributing the call load
across a multitude of compromised devices in essence a distributed compromise
of service. By spreading the call load across a wide range of compromised
devices it affords the malicious users good protections from detection by the
owners of the systems. Modifying one of John Paul Getty sayings illustrates this
concept “it is far easier to steal a $1 from 100 people than to try and steal $100
from one”. By using this modus operandi not only do attackers lower their
forensic fingerprint but also make it difficult for intrusion detection systems and
other methods of monitoring to detect a malfeasant call.
DENIAL OF SERVICE
Denial of Service (DoS) is a simple and well proven attack method which can be
achieved by flooding network connections, socket/port exhaustion, or resource
exhaustion of a service or server by overloading with the end result being memory
or CPU exhaustion. This exhaustion of service can have catastrophic outcomes
resulting in servers halting and rebooting or simply service to be useless due to
performance degradation. Motivations for this could be blackmail as has been
evinced already in businesses where availability is crucial for business e.g online
casinos where if you want to be able to collect revenues you have to be available
and online. This availability nexus is as previously mentioned an Achilles heel for
service of this kind.
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The other motivation is to gain a competitive advantage over a competitor
remembering not all businesses behave ethically. If people cannot contact you on
the phone service you are using it becomes increasingly difficult to conduct
business with you and they will seek out an alternative. A DoS in these types of
cases does not have to be 24/7 to be effective, attacks at key times during a
business calendar can have devastating consequences for any business
sustainability or viability.
DETECTION OF MALICIOUS ACTIVITY
The use of intrusion detection systems whether they be host based or network
based is one preferred way of detecting malicious activity on a network directed
towards VoIP systems. Many of the attack or enumeration tools such as
SIPvicious tool suite [5]when used in default mode are overt, verbose and readily
identified. The following extract from a system log file is an example of a
transaction between a system and the SIPvicious tool suite
UDP message received [416] bytes :
OPTIONS sip:100@xx3.xxx.xxx.xxx SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.160.67.18:5061;branch=z9hG4bK2559388112;rport
Content-Length: 0
From: "sipvicious"<sip:100@1.1.1.1>;
tag=6362613137353765313363340131303635333036333336
Accept: application/sdp
User-Agent: friendly-scanner
To: "sipvicious"sip:100@1.1.1.1
Contact: sip:100@10.160.67.18:5061
CSeq: 1 OPTIONS
Call-ID: 1020236891970287777884434
Max-Forwards: 70

As can be clearly seen as highlighted there are hallmarks or indicators of a
SIPvicious based attack on a system. It is a simple task to write some intrusion
detection system rules from this exchange. An example Snort rule could be
alert UDP any any → any (msg:”sipvicious default
scan”; content: “|736970766963696f7573|”;)

This rule simply traps for any UDP connection that has the string sipvicious in it.
Alternatively the string friendly-scanner could also be trapped. With the use of
dynamic rules one could also for instance trap the next 500 packets from the
attackers IP to be able to examine any connections or activity being undertaken by
the attacking IP.
The caveat on these types of attacks is that the use of these tools is as provided by
the author and that are typically initiated by inexperienced attackers often referred
to as script kiddies or n00bs. The inexperienced attacker does often not know or
often understand the tool they are using and that they are leaving behind a large
forensic fingerprint. One could further postulate that these types of attacks are not
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organised criminals or experienced cyber criminals searching for vulnerable VoIP
systems. These attackers instead will utilise methods that are relatively
anonymous and will avoid detection by intrusion detection rule sets in use. This
exact scenario now presents another problem for providers or users of VoIP
systems who wish to protect the service. The problem is that to protect a VoiP
system from compromise one has to assume that all connections are malicious
and subject them to intense inspection and scrutiny and or use a whitelist which
defeats the purpose largely of having a open connection. One of the known
degraders of any network based system and in particular VoIP based systems
performance is latency, by performing any form of packet inspection packet
latency will be increased. Hence remedy through the enforcement of large rulesets
and packet inspections may in fact be worse than the overall complaint.
USING SIMPLE HONEYPOTS TO DETECTING SCANNING OR
ENUMERATION
A talk by Sjur Usken [6] outlines a method for using SIPp [7] and a packet
logging tool Daemonlogger [8] as a simple honeypot for the detection of scanning
and enumeration by an attacker of VoIP systems. The SIPp suite is a test tool or
traffic generator for the SIP protocol that is legitimately used to test systems. It
enables call establishment, call flow analysis, message statistics and the testing of
a range of features found in VoIP systems. This suite provides the basis for low
level interactions with the attacking entity.
Daemonlogger is a program that can sniff network traffic and either spool it to
disk or redirect it to another network interface. In the executing of the current
research it is used to write the potentially malicious traffic to disk and log it for
later forensic analysis. Daemonlogger uses rulesets in tcpdump syntax an example
rule follows
dst port 5060 or dst port 16384 or dst port 5061 or
dst port 1720

will trap for connections on ports 5060, 16384, 5061, 1720. Once there are
packets trapped then action is initated to record the packets.
The system being used in our research utilizes rudiments of the system proposed
and used by [6]. The system is replicated across a number of sensors we have
installed in a honeypot system that utilizes Surfnet IDS as its supporting
infrastructure. SurfnetIDS uses a collection of sensors that are connected back to
logging infrastructure via VPN. In our setup there is a multitude of recordings
occurring.
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Basic SQL

Daemonlogger

SurfIDS_Snort

The sensors report their VoIP activity back to a customized
SQL database for logging of attack data. No packets are
captured.
File based logging that daemonlogger provides on each
sensor, any files produced by daemonlogger are sent back via
SCP to the central logging server for storage and analysis.
This is in addition to a full dump of the Ethernet connection
using tcpdump –w
The sensors report via VPN to a Snort based database using
custom IDS based rules that respond as a result of a known
VoIP attack. These records are incorporated into the
SurfnetIDS reporting mechanisms. In this record the
attacking IP numbers are also matched against the GeoIP
suite for country of origin information.

As the honeypot research is formative and utilizing empirical learning to modify
and adapt the honeypot previous experience in deploying honeypot research
indicates that there is a scientific need to capture attack data with a multitude of
types. The use of multiple streams or samples also allows the use of multiple tools
and techniques to validate findings or investigate observed phenomena.
TECHNIQUES UNDER DEVELOPMENT
Apart from deep packet inspection in Wireshark and other packet analysis tools,
the research is attempting to find suitable methods for automated alert and
response to VoIP oriented attacks.
AUTOMATED ALERTING DEVELOPMENTS
This is already enabled by the research modus operandii to some degree by the
use of Snort and custom IDS rulesets we are developing for VoIP systems. IDS
systems in combination with analysis consoles such as ACID or Base or
SnortAlert allow for much of this systematic alerting or monitoring to occur. Or in
the case of this research enable timely inspection and review of attacks on the
systems.
The research is also looking at methods for using daemonlogger to redirect output
to another interface that becomes a trigger response i.e any traffic on that interface
indicates potential malicious activity. This could be a idle VPN connection that
when triggered will initiate connection that then results in an escalation of
response or monitoring.
The on-demand production of graphical representation of activity using Graphviz
[9] produced images using Afterglow is also another approach being developed in
the research. The need for using graphical methods for analysis in combating the
complexity of alert data received by network systems is well established. The
ability to generate graphs on demand allows a new lense or view of the dataset.
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AUTOMATED RESPONSE DEVELOPMENT
Automated response is largely enabled by IDS in this case Snort and development
of dynamic rules in combination with firewall or host.deny responses. This
dynamic use of IDS as always is a balancing act between false positives and
legitimate usability of the system. Another factor that increases problems is that
VoIP systems use UDP for transport and the resulting transmissions lack the
formal controls and discipline with respect to packet sequence, latency and other
attributes that a TCP based transmission can be afforded.
As mentioned previously the use of dynamic rules in Snort allows for a variety of
actions not all of them need be a complete denial of route to be effective. The
triggered recording of attack sessions allows for smaller analysis parcels to be
produced rather than having to trawl large packet capture for small packet
sequences this produces significant efficiencies in analysis.
Response via device fingerprint spoofing is a well used paradigm in honeypots
and honeyd [10] is just one exemplar of the technique. The honeypot system will
use known robust fingerprints of a device to fool the attacker into believing they
are in fact scanning or interacting with a real device when in fact it is the
honeypot. The current research is attempting to generate reliable system
fingerprints using NMAP an active network fingerprinter and p0f a passive
network fingerprinter for commonly used ADSL VoIP enabled routers. In
addition via the production of simple PERL scripts we are also trying to emulate
basic service responses to probes by some of the commonly used tools. The aim
of the scripts is not to provide perfect emulation of service but merely to mimic
standard responses in an attempt to get the attacker to escalate the attack to a
higher level of interaction and attack.
CONCLUSION
The research is currently ongoing and should produce systems capable of a more
realistic emulation of vulnerable VoIP systems. The research purposefully focuses
on VoIP system vulnerability and not standard honeypot systems as there is a
significant and successful body of knowledge based around these systems
already. It should however, be noted that much of the research is underpinned by
successful techniques and methods from within the existing honeypot knowledge
domain.
The research has already uncovered increasing levels of probing and enumeration
of VoIP systems from a variety of locations on the Internet. The next stage of the
research is to start classifying the level of enumeration and attack being
undertaken by these attackers to determine if the activity is mere scanning or
escalatory in nature and activity that is genuinely seeking to compromise the
systems.
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